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NOTES
CERTIORARI TO ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN MISSOURI
Certiorari is a prerogative writ issued by a superior to an
inferior tribunal possessing limited jurisdiction, requiring the
certification and return to the former of the record in a cause
before the latter.' The writ is of ancient origin,2 and since the
Cardiff Bridge case, 3 decided in King's Bench in 1700, its avail-
ability to review allegedly illegal orders of administrative tribu-
nals has been established.4 The writ will lie only if no other reme-
dies are available5 In addition, it is limited to the review of
judicial, or quasi-judicial acts.6 In consequence, a good deal of
confusion has arisen in the American law, since what is or is
1. See 1 Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3rd ed. 1914) 443. Comment
is made regarding the lack of precise judicial definition of the public bodies
and proceedings to which certiorari is applicable. For previous discussions
of the writ of certiorari in Missouri, in general, see Finkelnburg and Wil-
liams, Missouri Appellate Practice (2nd ed. 1906) 221; McBaine, The Writ
of Certiorari in Missouri (1915) 6 Law Ser. Mo. Bull. 3. 4 Houts, Missouri
Pleading and Practice (1937) c. 36, 663 et seq. For discussion of the writ
directed to the courts of appeal, see Atwood, Certiorari in Missouri (1934)
2 Kan. City L. Rev. 35; McBaine, Certiorari from the Missouri Supreme
Court to the Courts of Appeals (1916) 13 Law Ser. Mo. Bull. 30; Graves,
Certiorari as Used by the Supreme Court in the Interest of Harmony of
Opinion and Uniformity of the Law (1922) 24 Law Ser. Mo. Bull. 3. For
the statutory writ of certiorari to justices of the peace in unlawful detainer
suits see R. S. Mo. (1939) §§2869-2878, 2894-2907.
2. 1 Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3rd ed. 1914) 443; Dickinson, Ad-
rinistrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law (1927) 62, n. 79; Ferris,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies (1926) 177; Goodnow, The Writ of Cer-
tiorari (1891) 6 Pol. Sci. Q. 493.
3. Rex v. Inhabitants in Glamorganshire (K. B. 1700) 1 Ld. Raym. 580,
91 Eng. Rep. 1287.
4. See Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property (1928)
255; Goodnow, supra note 2, at 516-517.
5. State ex rel. Mo. Pac. By. v. Edwards (1891) 104 Mo. 125, 16 S. W.
117; State ex rel. Kansas & Texas Coal Ry. v. Shelton (1900) 154 Mo. 670,
55 S. W. 1008, 50 L. R. A. 798. In the latter case Marshall, J., dissented,
upon the ground, inter alia, that certiorari lies in the discretion of the court
where an appeal or writ of error does not afford an adequate remedy.
This dissent became the rule in State ex rel. Hamilton v. Guinotte (1900)
156 Mo. 513, 57 S. W. 281, 50 L. R. A. 787. Statements continue to be made,
however, that where the tribunal has jurisdiction and its action can be
reviewed by appeal or writ of error, certiorari will not lie. See, e. g., State
ex rel. Palmer v. Elliff (1933) 332 Mo. 229, 235, 58 S. W. (2d) 283, 286,
and cases cited. See also Finkelnburg and Williams, op. cit. supra, note 1,
at 223.
6. See Goodnow, supra note 2, at 506; Note (1937) 25 Calif. L. Rev.
694; Note (1931) 17 Cornell L. Q. 103; Note (1936) 31 Ill. L. Rev. 230,
289; Note (1934) 19 Ia. L. Rev. 609.
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not judicial has been determined according to varying theories
in each jurisdiction."
In determining what is or is not a judicial act, the court may
consider either the nature of the act itself or the character of
the tribunal whose action is sought to be reviewed. The great
majority of American jurisdictions, however, have been rather
liberal in allowing the writ even where the act was performed
by a body not strictly judicial, if the act was an exercise of
judicial, as distinguished from executive or legislative power. 8
Doctrines vary from a strict rule in California, where the grant
of the writ depends upon the character of the tribunal, and hence
is denied as respects all administrative decisions,9 to a very liberal
one in New Jersey, where a wide range of acts may be reviewed,
whether or not they are judicial, because of the general principle
that the courts have power on certiorari to remedy wrongs in-
flicted on individuals, where there is no other adequate remedy.10
In Missouri, the nature of the act, rather than the character of
the tribunal is determinative of whether certiorari will be
granted.1 . Although the decisions are not clear,12 they generally
7. See Goodnow, supra note 2, at 506-511; Note (1937) 25 Calif. L. Rev.
694; Note (1931) 17 Cornell L. Q. 103; Note (1936) 31 Ill. L. Rev. 230,
239; Note (1934) 19 Ia. L. Rev. 609. The concepts of "judicial" and "quasi-judicial" are exceedingly vague. See Brown, Administrative Commissions
and the Judicial Power (1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 261; Finkelman, Separa-
tion of Powers: A Study in Administrative Law (1936) 1 U. of Toronto
L. J. 313, 324-332; Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Ad-
ministrative Law Theory (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 538, 551 et seq.
8. See Goodnow, supra note 2, at 506. The act is often labelled "quasi-judicial" and therefore reviewable. See, e. g., Batty v. Arizona State Dental
Board (Ariz. 1941) 112 P. (2d) 870; Citizens' Club v. Welling (1933) 83
Utah 81, 27 P. (2d) 23; Borgnis v. Falk Co. (1911) 147 Wis. 327, 133
N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489.
9. Standard Oil Co. of California v. State Board of Equalization (1936)
6 Cal. (2d) 557, 59 P. (2d) 119; Note (1937) 25 Calif. L. Rev. 694. In
the Standard Oil case it was held that certiorari would lie only to review
the exercise of judicial functions and that, since the legislature was without
power to confer judicial functions upon a state-wide administrative agency
of the character of the State Board of Equalization, the functions of that
body could not be judicial.
10. This proposition is upheld by a line of cases from Treasurer v. Mul-
ford (1857) 26 N. J. L. 49 to Roselle v. Borough of Verona (1936) 14
N. J. Misc. 649, 186 At. 590 (certiorari to review a resolution of the bor-
ough providing for advertising for bids for the borough's scavenger con-
tract). See Goodnow, supra note 2, at 511. See also 11 C. J. 121, n. 52,
§67; 14 C. J. S. 143, §17. In North Dakota the remedy of certiorari extends
to every case where inferior courts, officers, boards, or tribunals have ex-
ceeded their authority and there is no adequate remedy otherwise. State
ex rel. Olson v. Welford (1935) 65 N. D. 522, 260 N. W. 593.
11. See State ex rel. Davidson v. Caldwell (1925) 310 Mo. 397, 276 S. W.
631.
12. As early as 1891, Goodnow, supra note 2, at 511, thought that Mis-
souri courts, apparently without full consciousness of what was happening,
had adopted the New Jersey rule that review could be had by certiorari
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state that only judicial acts will be reviewed.13 How the Missouri
courts have decided that a particular act is judicial is not, how-
ever, easy to determine; and it must be realized that an act may
sometimes be called "non-judicial" when found in a particular
context at a particular point of time and be called "judicial" if
review is sought in a different situation or at a different point
of time.4
Since its inception, certiorari has been a means of appealing
only questions of law.15 It was most frequently used in England
to correct excesses of jurisdiction of justices of the peace.16
Divergencies arose in this country because of the belief that the
office of the writ was to review only errors of jurisdiction,17 and
that is its principal use in many courts at the present time.'8
A few states have gone beyond this use for certain purposes,
making the writ similar to an appeal or writ of error to bring
up all errors of law, including erroneous application of law to
the findings, lack of basis in the evidence for the findings, or
improper admission of exclusion of evidence.' 9 Changes have at
times been made by statute. For example, in Illinois, under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the courts review the weight of
the evidence in all proceedings by certiorari. 20 In Missouri, the
because of the general principle that the writ could be used to remedy
wrongs inflicted on individuals, regardless of whether or not the act was
judicial.
18. There are frequent statements to that effect in the cases. See, e. g.,
In re Saline Co. Subscription (1869) 45 Mo. 52; State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Harrison (1897) 141 Mo. 12, 41 S. W. 971; State ex rel. Powell
v. Shocklee (1911) 237 Mo. 460, 141 S. W. 614; State ex rel. Manion v.
Dawson (1920) 284 Mo. 490, 225 S. W. 97; State ex rel. Turner v. Penman
(1926) 220 Mo. App. 193, 282 S. W. 498.
14. For example, rate making may be called legislative at one point and
judicial at another, so that judicial review will be allowed. See note 68,
infra. See also the discussion of drainage district cases, text at notes 44 to
48, infra.
15. Goodnow, supra note 2, at 516.
16. Ibid.
17. Freund, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 261.
18. See 14 C. J. S. §23, 160 et seq., where it is said that this is the pri-
mary, and in some jurisdictions, the sole office of the writ.
19. See Comment (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 1017, 1018; Comment (1934) 1
U. Chi. L. Rev. 801. One specialized use of the writ in Missouri is to har-
monize opinions of lower courts with prior decisions of the supreme court.
See material cited supra note 1.
20. Freund, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 262, n. 9, and 263. Note (1936)
31 Ill. L. Rev. 230, 239; Comment (1915) 9 Ill. L. Rev. 591; Comment (1934)
1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 801. In New York the law governing certiorari has been
altered by statute. Writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition have
been expressly abolished. N. Y. Civil Practice Act §1283 (Thompson's Laws
of New York 1939). In their place, a single, simplified procedure is pro-
vided (§§1284-1306).
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writ has led a double life. On the one hand, there is the common
law writ with its various incidents, including a rather conserva-
tive view of the scope of review; on the other, there are statutory
writs provided by the legislature for reviewing the actions of a
number of administrative agencies.
WHAT WILL BE REVIEWED
Common Law Certiorari
Numerous statements can be found in the reported cases to
the effect that in Missouri certiorari is the writ as it was at
common law, without statutory modification,21 and these state-
ments are true except insofar as statutes dealing with particular
agencies, such as the Public Service Commission and State Board
of Health, provide for a special certiorari, or "writ of review."
However, to determine what, in the eyes of Missouri courts, is
the scope of the common law writ of certiorari is not a simple
task.
The County Court
The reported cases indicate that one of the most frequent uses
of the writ has been to review the actions of the county courts.
In Missouri, the county court is a tribunal of limited jurisdic-
tion2 2 which performs both administrative and judicial func-
tions.2 3 It has often been said that certiorari will lie only to
review judicial functions.24 However, many varieties of acts of
the county court have been reviewed by certiorari, and it has
not always been clear how the appellate court determined that
they were judicial. In many cases, certiorari has been granted
without a discussion of whether or not the act was judicial,25
21. See, e. g., Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co. v. Morton (1858) 27 Mo.
317; In re Saline Co. Subscription (1869) 45 Mo. 52; State ex rel. Bren-
nan v. Walbridge (1895) 62 Mo. App. 162; State ex rel. Summerson v.
Goodrich (1914) 257 Mo. 40, 165 S. W. 707; State ex rel. Lunsford v.
Landon (1924) 304 Mo. 654, 265 S. W. 529; 14 C. J. S. 134. See also
McBaine, The Writ of Certiorari in Missouri (1915) 16 Law Ser. Mo. Bull.
3. See also Mo. Const. (1875) Art. VI, §§3, 12, 23, and Amend. (1884) Art.
VI, §§4, 8. Certiorari to justices of the peace is provided for in R. S. Mo.
(1939) §§2869-2878, 2894-2907.
22. Mo. Const. (1875) Art. VI, §36.
23. For example, the county courts are authorized to issue auctioneer
licenses, R. S. Mo. (1939) §14915; issue courthouse and jail bonds, R. S.
Mo. (1939) §§3292-3300; make bounty payments for wolves and predatory
animals, R. S. Mo. (1939) §14559, etc.
24. See, e. g., State ex rel. Powell v. Shoeldee (1911) 237 Mo. 460, 141
S. W. 614. See also note 13, supra.
25. See, e. g., State ex rel. Sanks v. Johnson (1909) 138 Mo. App. 306,
121 S. W. 780 (county court contracted for employment of prisoner con-
fined in the county jail) ; State ex rel. Major v. Patterson (1910) 229 Mo.
364, 129 S. W. 894 (proceedings to divide a township into justice of the
peace districts).
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or has been granted after the court has stated that the act was
judicial, without assigning reasons." There are numerous re-
ported cases granting certiorari to review the action of the county
court in the granting or revocation of dramshop licenses,27 the
establishment of drainage districts, 28 the establishment of new
roads, 29 and proceedings with respect to local option elections.2 0
Certiorari has also been granted to review the court's action in
excluding land from village limits,31 in dividing a township into
Justice of the Peace districts,32 in examining the accounts of the
collector,3 3 and in contracting for the employment of a prisoner
confined in the county jail.34
In one case the appellate court laid down a doctrine which
would apparently allow review in almost any situation. State
ex rel. Arnold v. Lickta35 was a proceeding to revoke a dramshop
license. There the St. Louis Court of Appeals admitted that the
county court in revoking the license was not exercising a judicial
function, but it granted certiorari on the ground that in deter-
mining whether or not the charges against relator brought the
case within its jurisdiction to revoke his license, the county court
26. See, e. g., Owens v. Andrew County Court (1872) 49 Mo. 372 (ex-
amining accounts of collector a judicial act).
27. State ex rel. Harrah v. Cauthorn (1890) 40 Mo. App. 94; State ex
rel. Reider v. The Moniteau County Ct. (1891) 45 Mo. App. 387; State v.
Schneider (1892) 47 Mo. App. 669; State ex tel. Hill v. Moore (1900) 84
Mo. App. 11; State ex rel. Moore v. McDavid (1900) 84 Mo. App. 47;
State ex rel. Sager v. Mulvihill (1905) 113 Mo. App. 324, 88 S. W. 773;
State ex tel. Arnold v. Lichta (1908) 130 Mo. App. 284, 109 S. W. 825;
State ex inf. Keller v. Buchanan County Ct. (1909) 135 Mo. App. 143, 116
S. W. 14; State ex rel. Farris v. Amick (1912) 161 Mo. App. 13, 142 S. W.
1104; State ex tel. Smith v. Dykeman (1911) 153 Mo. App. 416, 134 S. W.
120; State ex rel. Gloyd v. Gilbert (1912) 164 Mo. App. 139, 148 S. W. 125;
State ex rel. Carman v. Ross (1914) 177 Mo. App. 223, 162 S. W. 702.
28. State ex rel. Applegate v. Taylor (1909) 224 Mo. 393, 123 S. W.
892; State ex tel. Ruppel v. Wiethaupt (1914) 254 Mo. 319, 162 S. W. 163;
State ex tel. Turner v. Penman (1926) 220 Mo. App. 193, 282 S. W. 498.
29. State ex tel. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. City of Kansas (1886) 89
Mo. 34, 14 S. W. 515; Chicago, R. I. & P. ly. v. Young (1888) 96 Mo. 39,
8 S. W. 776.
80. State ex tel. Martin v. Wilson (1908) 129 Mo. App. 242, 108 S. W.
128; State ex rel. Kelley v. Wooten (1909) 139 Mo. App. 231, 122 S. W.
1103; State ex Tel. Rippee v. Forest (1914) 177 Mo. App. 245, 162 S. W.
706; State ex tel. Brines v. Franklin (1926) 220 Mo. App. 232, 283 S. W.
712.
31. In re Village of Grandview v. McElroy (1928) 222 Mo. App. 787,
9 S. W. (2d) 829.
32. State ex rel. Major v. Patterson (1910) 229 Mo. 364, 129 S. W. 894.
33. Owens v. Andrew County Court (1872) 49 Mo. 372.
34. State ex rel. Sanks v. Johnson (1909) 138 Mo. App. 306, 121 S. W.
780.
35. (1908) 130 Mo. App. 284, 109 S. W. 825, 827.
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exercised judicial power.3 6 Upon this basis, it would seem that
any administrative action could be reviewed under guise of re-
viewing the tribunal's determination that it had jurisdiction.
In other cases, the courts have granted certiorari to the county
court to review the revocation of dramshop licenses without dis-
cussing the nature of the action, upon the basis that it is proper
to give relief to an injured party on certiorari when the tribunal
has proceeded without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdic-
tion.3 7 That the decisions were not, however, influenced primarily
by the fact that the county court appears to be a judicial tribunal
is indicated by the fact that the jurisdiction of the excise com-
missioner 38 and of the mayor and board of aldermen 39 to grant
dramship licenses has also been reviewed.
The doctrine of the Lichta case does not seem to have been
adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, an
early Missouri case, In the Matter of the Saline County Subscrip-
tion, gave a definition of "judicial action" which seems much
narrower :40
Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of
parties who in general appear or are brought before the
tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some
decision or judgment is rendered. It implies impartiality,
disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims, and is in-
consistent with discretion on the one hand-for the tribunal
must decide according to law and the rights of the parties-
or with dictation on the other.
In the Saline County Subscription case, certiorari was quashed
on the ground that the action of the county court in subscribing
to railroad stock and issuing bonds for payment thereof was dis-
cretionary, not judicial. Other examples of acts of the county
court held to be non-judicial are the auditing of a demand against
the county and entry of rejection of a claim,41 and an order
removing the county seat.4 2 In the latter case, two questions were
involved; namely, the court's action in providing an office for the
recorder of deeds according to statute, and its action in removing
36. See also State ex rel. Carman v. Ross (1914) 177 Mo. App. 223, 162
S. W. 702.
37. See, e. g., State ex rel. Smith v. Dykeman (1911) 153 Mo. App. 416,
134 S. W. 120.
38. State ex rel. Sager v. Mulvihill (1905) 113 Mo. App. 324, 88 S. W.
773; State ex rel. Spencer v. Anderson (Mo. App. 1937) 101 S. W. (2d)
530.
39. State ex rel. Robinson v. Neosho (1894) 57 Mo. App. 192.
40. (1869) 45 Mo. 52, 53.
41. Phelps County v. Bishop (1870) 46 Mo. 68.
42. State ex rel. Powell v. Shocklee (1911) 237 Mo. 460, 141 S. W. 614.
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the county seat, which the supreme court said was without
authority, statutory or otherwise. In both instances, the action
was called administrative or ministerial.
43
Proceedings to establish drainage districts have presented some
difficulty. In State ex rel. Ruppel v. Wiethaupt,4 which involved
a question of insufficient notice, it was said that certiorari was
the proper remedy, because a provision in the statute authoriz-
ing an appeal to court, which specified the questions to be con-
sidered, omitted the sufficiency of notice and thereby denied a
remedy by appeal upon this point. Proper notice was held to be a
jurisdictional prerequisite which certiorari would reach, and the
court did not consider whether the board's action otherwise was
judicial. Six years later, in State ex rel. Manion v. Dawson"
the supreme court, en bane, without citing the Wiethaupt case,
and not being bothered by a question of notice, held that the act
of the circuit court in extending the boundary lines of a drainage
district so as to incorporate additional territory was a legislative
act not reviewable by certiorari. The court said :46
* * * it is clear that the method of fixing such boundaries,
whether by an original decree of incorporation or by exten-
sion proceedings, is wholly immaterial. In either event it is
a legislative act, and therefore not subject to review by our
writ of certiorari.
Certainly the two cases above are reconcilable on the basis that
notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite which may be reviewed by
certiorari. The court of appeals, however, in State ex rel. Turner
v. Penman,47 confronted, inter alia by a question of sufficiency
of notice, determined that the Wiethaupt case was not overruled
by the Dawson case, and, going further than seems justified by
either of the above cases, allowed certiorari in addition to review
the merits of proceedings with regard to the organization and
incorporation of a drainage district.4s
43. That the supreme court probably would not recognize the test in the
LUchta case (text at note 35, supra) is indicated by the fact that it might
have been, and was not, applied in the Shocklee case.
44. (1914) 254 Mo. 319, 162 S. W. 163.
45. (1920) 284 Mo. 490, 225 S. W. 97.
46. State ex rel. Manion v. Dawson (1920) 284 Mo. 490, 507, 225 S. W.
97, 100.
47. (1926) 220 Mo. App. 193, 282 S. W. 498.
48. These drainage district cases furnish an indication that, perhaps,
after all, the courts, in granting certiorari, are often concerned primarily
with underlying considerations and merely label an act "judicial" after they
have arrived at their conclusion on other grounds. Insufficiency or lack of
notice is a serious defect in any type of proceeding, and where other review
is precluded, a court is apt to stretch legal concepts in order to arrive at
a just result.
1941] NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
'92 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
Proceedings of the county courts with regard to local option
elections49 have in general been reviewed by certiorari without
discussion of the nature of the act of the lower tribunal. The
reviewing courts, however, have merely inquired whether the
county court had satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites, such
as notice and proof of publication. This has been true, also, where
certiorari has been granted to review proceedings to open roads.eo
Taxation
Another type of action of the county court reviewed by cer-
tiorari has been its review of the assessment of taxes.51 This sort
of action has been reviewed more frequently, however, by cer-
tiorari directed to the assessor, the various boards of equaliza-
tion, and the State Tax Commission. Action of taxing officials
has in general appeared to be rather clearly judicial, so that
courts have spent little effort in explaining why it is so, and
certiorari has been granted without question.
The court in State ex rel. Mount Mora Cemetery Ass'n v.
Carey,52 after citation of authorities from other states, held that
in assessing personal property, the assessor was acting judicially,
since he had to determine its value. In cases involving boards
of equalization, the court has generally been content with the
bald statement that the action was judicial' 3
49. State ex tel. Martin v. Wilson (1908) 129 Mo. App. 242, 108 S. W.
128 (record quashed because not a majority of votes in favor of the law) ;
State ex tel. Kelley v. Wooten (1909) 139 Mo. App. 231, 122 S. W. 1103
(statutory requisites for jurisdiction present) ; State ex Tel. Rippee v. Forest
(1914) 177 Mo. App. 245, 162 S. W. 706 (record quashed for failure to
show court's jurisdiction) ; State ex rel. Brines v. Franklin (1926) 220 Mo.
App. 232, 283 S. W. 712 (jurisdiction shown in record).
50. State ex tel. Chicago, B. & Q. R. . v. City of Kansas (1886) 89
Mo. 34, 14 S. W. 515 (record showed compliance with statutory requisites);
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Young (1888) 96 Mo. 39, 8 S. W. 776 (jurisdic-
tional requisites did not affirmatively appear) ; State ex Tel. Combs v. Staten
(1916) 268 Mo. 288, 187 S. W. 42 (court examined the record and said
county court had jurisdiction, but since relator had adequate remedy by
appeal, he could not resort to certiorari).
51. State on petition of Taylor v. St. Louis Co. Ct. (1871) 47 Mo. 594
(action "clearly judicial").
52. (1908) 210 Mo. 235, 109 S. W. 1.
53. Such statements have been made in cases involving county, city, and
state boards of equalization, from State ex rel. Halpin v. Powers (1878)
68 Mo. 320 to State ex tel. St. Louis County v. Evans (Mo. 1940) 139
S. W. (2d) 967. Typical statements are found in State ex tel. Stone v.
Christian County Bank (1911) 234 Mo. 194, 197, 136 S. W. 335, 336: "In
making the order raising the valuation of the property for taxation, * * *
the county board of equalization was acting in a judicial capacity"; and
in State ex tel. Van Raalte v. Board of Equalization (1914) 256 Mo. 455,
461, 165 S. W. 1047, 1048: "The functions of the board of equalization in
judging the assessments of property are judicial * * *." In State ex rel.
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School Districts
A Missouri statute5 4 provides that in proceedings involving
two or more school districts, to form new school districts or
change the boundaries of old ones, if the result of the election
shows disagreement among the districts affected, the superin-
tendent of schools shall appoint a board of arbitrators to con-
sider the necessity for the change and render a final decision
thereon. Certiorari has been used frequently to test the validity
of proceedings before the board, without question of the judicial
nature of the action,5" the reviewing court considering only
whether the board had jurisdiction.
Davis v. Walden (1983) 332 Mo. 680, 685, 60 S. W. (2d) 24, 26, it was
said: "The county board of equalization is a tribunal of limited powers and
jurisdiction. In performing its functions its acts are judicial in character
* * *." In State ex rel. Lathrop v. Dowling (1872) 50 Mo. 134, 136, the
respondent was a board of appeals from the assessment of taxes by the
assessor of the city of Hannibal. The court said merely: "The action of the
board of appeals is judicial in its nature * * *."
It has been held, however, that although the State Board of Equalization
acts judicially, it is not a tribunal within the meaning of Mo. Const. (1875)
Art. VI, §23, which gives the circuit court superintending control over "all
inferior tribunals." State ex rel. Gardner v. Hall (1920) 282 Mo. 425, 221
S. W. 708. See also State ex rel. Wyatt v. Vaile (1894) 122 Mo. 33, 47,
26 S. W. 672; Bank of Carthage v. Thomas (1932) 330 Mo. 19, 26, 48 S. W.
(2d) 930. It seems that the question whether the state board acts legis-
latively, in equalizing among counties, whereas county and city boards actjudicially in dealing with individuals, has not been considered in Missouri.
However, the city and county boards must give notice to the taxpayer,
whereas the state board need not, which might be some indication. Colum-
bia Terminals Co. v. Koeln (1928) 319 Mo. 445, 3 S. W. (2d) 1021. Cf.
Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado (1915) 239 U. S. 441, wherein the implication
was that a state board of equalization acted legislatively; and Standard Oil
Co. of California v. State Board of Equalization (1936) 6 Cal. (2d) 557,
59 P. (2d) 119, where it was held that the legislature was without power
to confer judicial functions upon a statewide administrative agency of the
character of the state board of equalization. In Missouri it has been held
that the circuit court of the proper venue has jurisdiction in certiorari over
a local board of equalization. State ex rel. Gardner v. Hall (1920) 282 Mo.
425, 221 S. W. 708.
54. R. S. Mo. (1939) §10410.
55. State ex rel. School District v. Williams (1897) 70 Mo. App. 238 (no
final order, so certiorari quashed) ; School District v. Pace (1905) 113 Mo.
App. 134, 87 S. W. 580 (record quashed for failure to show jurisdiction);
State ex rel. School District v. Andrae (1909) 216 Mo. 617, 116 S. W. 561
(record showed jurisdiction) ; State ex rel. School District v. Sexton (1910)
151 Mo. App. 517, 132 S. W. 11 (record showed jurisdiction); School Dis-
tricts v. Yates (1912) 161 Mo. App. 107, 142 S. W. 791 (record showed
jurisdiction, and official acts of superintendent thereafter assumed to be
regular); State ex rel. King v. Moreland (Mo. App. 1916) 189 S. W. 602
(jurisdictional requirements lacking); State ex rel. Morrison v. Sims (Mo.
App. 1917) 201 S. W. 910 (record sufficient to show jurisdiction); State
ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. v. Ingram (Mo. App. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d)
118 (record showed lack of jurisdiction); State ex rel. School Dist. v.
Begeman (1928) 221 Mo. App. 257, 2 S. W. (2d) 110 (presumption that
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Appointment to and Removal from Office
Proceedings involving appointment to or removal from office
have provided a fruitful field for review by certiorari. The cases
seem to be in accord, to the effect that removal from office is a
judicial act.5 6 Consequently, certiorari has issued to review the
action of a township board,57 the board of railroad and ware-
house commissioners, 5 a circuit judge," the board of police com-
missioners, 6 the mayor 6' and city council,62 and the county
court.6 3 An early case, however, held that certiorari was not
available to review proceedings of the county court with regard
to the appointment of members of the county institute board.
It was said that whereas certiorari was appropriate to review
action in removal of an officer for cause, because in such case a
trial and judicial determination were necessary, it would not lie
to review an appointment, since an appointment is an adminis-
trative, not a judicial act.6 4
preliminary steps complied with, otherwise jurisdiction shown, so certiorari
quashed).
56. In State ex rel. Davidson v. Caldwell (1925) 310 Mo. 397, 276 S. W.
631 it was said that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law and the rights of the parties are in regard to the matter in con-
troversy. Other cases have merely said that the proceeding was judicial
or quasi-judicial in nature. State ex rel. Tilley v. Slover (1892) 113 Mo.
202, 20 S. W. 788; State ex rel. Heimburger v. Wells (1908) 210 Mo. 601,
109 S. W. 758; State ex rel. Knox v. Selby (1908) 133 Mo. App. 552, 113
S. W. 682 ("tantamount to a judgment of not guilty"); State ex rel. Flow-
ers v. Morehead (1914) 256 Mo. 683, 165 S. W. 746.
57. State ex rel. Davidson v. Cadwell (1925) 310 Mo. 397, 276 S. W.
631.
58. State ex rel. Tedford v. Knott (1907) 207 Mo. 167, 105 S. W. 1040
(action arbitrary and void because in excess of jurisdiction).
59. State ex rel. Tilley v. Slover (1892) 113 Mo. 202, 20 S. W. 788.
60. State ex rel. Campbell v. Police Comm'rs (1883) 14 Mo. App. 297,
aff'd (1885) 88 Mo. 144 (removal not shown to be for cause); State ex rel.
Kennedy v. Remmers (1936) 340 Mo. 126, 101 S. W. (2d) 70 (rule vio-
lated by relator was unreasonable and void, so no jurisdiction to remove).
61. State ex rel. Brennan v. Walbridge (1895) 62 Mo. App. 162 (juris-
diction shown); State ex rel. Bristol v. Walbridge (1897) 69 Mo. App. 657
(removal for cause); State ex rel. Heimburger v. Wells (1908) 210 Mo.
601, 109 S. W. 758.
62. State ex rel. Denison v. City of St. Louis (1886) 90 Mo. 19, 1 S. W.
757 (charges, notice, and hearing insufficient) ; State ex rel. Knox v. Selby
(1908) 133 Mo. App. 552, 113 S. W. 682 (proceedings had been begun and
then dropped, so certiorari would not lie).
63. State ex rel. Flowers v. Morehead (1914) 256 Mo. 683, 165 S. W.
746 (removal beyond the court's jurisdiction); State ex rel. Jones v. Smiley
(1927) 317 Mo. 1283, 300 S. W. 459.
64. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Harrison (1897) 141 Mo. 12, 41
S. W. 971.
The instances in which the writ of certiorari has issued out of the
St. Louis Circuit Court are listed in a recent pamphlet prepared by the
Clerk of that court. Priest, Circuit Court Procedures No. 13 (St. Louis,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss1/13
Statutory Certiorari
The use of the term, "certiorari," in statutes which have pro-
vided for review of the actions of various tribunals seems to have
been largely a result of chance. These statutes furnish further
indications of the maze in which the courts find themselves when
they speak in terms of "legislative," "judicial," "quasi-judicial,"
"ministerial," and "administrative" acts. Here again it is neces-
sary to remember that for a particular purpose or at a particular
stage in a proceeding, action may be called "judicial," yet when
seemingly the same action is sought to be reviewed in another
setting, or at a different stage in the proceedings, it may be called
"non-judicial." Thus, for purposes of denying a writ of prohibi-
tion, the supreme court has said that the action of the State
Board of Health in revoking a license to practice medicine is
ministerial, not judicial.6 5 We find, however, that the statute
providing for certiorari to review the action of the board in
revoking licenses66 has been invoked frequently.67 In addition,
for some purposes, and at certain stages of the proceedings, rate-
making may be called legislative; but review is provided by cer-
tiorari of the rate-making as well as of the other activities of
the Public Service Commission.68
Mo.). The list includes certiorari to the board of election commissioners.
In at least one instance, however, the supreme court quashed a writ of
certiorari brought to review a determination of the person nominated in
a primary election, on the ground that the acts performed were ministerial
and administrative. State ex rel. Bentley v. Reynolds (1905) 190 Mo. 578,
89 S. W. 877.
65. State ex rel. McAnally v. Goodier (1906) 195 Mo. 551, 93 S. W. 928.
For purposes of mandamus, it was said that in passing on the right of an
applicant to a license, the board acts ministerially, not judicially. State ex
rel. McCleary v. Adcock (1907) 206 Mo. 550, 105 S. W. 270, 121 Am. St.
Rep. 681. That the proceeding in certiorari is a "case" within the mean-
ing of Mo. Const. (1875) Art. VI, §12, see State ex rel. Horton v. Clark
(1928) 320 Mo. 1190, 9 S. W. (2d) 635.
66. R. S. Mo. (1939) §9990.
67. See, e. g., State ex rel. Conway v. Hiller (1915) 266 Mo. 242, 180
S. W. 538; State ex rel. Ball v. State Board of Health (1930) 325 Mo. 41,
26 S. W. (2d) 773; State ex rel. Kerr v. Landwehr (Mo. 1930) 32 S. W.
(2d) 83; State ex rel. Baepler v. State Board of Health (1932) 330 Mo.
1200, 52 S. W. (2d) 743.
The common law writ of certiorari has on occasion issued to a city's
board of health to review its determination of a nuisance. State ex rel.
Parker-Washington Co. v. City of St. Louis (1907) 207 Mo. 354, 105 S. W.
748, 123 Am. St. Rep. 376.
68. This position is well illustrated in San Diego Land and Town Co. v.
National City (1899) 174 U. S. 739. At page 750-751, the court quoted from
Spring Valley Water Works v. Bryant (1887) 52 Cal. 132, as follows: "This
court has held that the fixing of water rates is a legislative act, at least
to the extent that the action of the proper bodies clothed with such power
cannot be controlled by writs which can issue only for the purpose of con-
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Other statutes provide for certiorari to the State Board of
Health to review the revocation or refusal of certificates to cos-
metologists, hairdressers, and manicurists;"9 to the Board of
Medical Examiners to review the refusal to recognize a medical
school ;7 and to the Board of Chiropractic Examiners to review
its determinations.71 Two other provisions for statutory cer-
tiorari have recently been adopted. One provides for certiorari
to the County Board of Zoning Adjustment ;72 the other provides
for review by certiorari of questions of law and fact determined
by the auditor in administering the sales tax.7 3
By analogy to federal decisions under the separation of powers
doctrine, it would seem that whether or not the action to be
reviewed was judicial might depend upon the scope of review
trolling judicial action. * * * There are other cases holding the act to be
legislative, but whether it is judicial, legislative or administrative is im-
material. Let it be which it may, it is not above the control of the courts
in proper cases."
It should be noted that the Missouri statute provides for certiorari to
the Public Service Commission "for the purpose of having the reasonable-
ness and lawfulness" of the decision or order determined. (R. S. Mo. (1939)
§5690). It might be said, therefore, that the use of the term, "certiorari,"
in this instance was fortuitous, and that in reality the legislature was
simply granting an appeal sufficient to meet the requirements of due process
indicated in Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota (1890) 134 U. S. 418
(Minnesota act providing that rates established by commission should be
final and conclusive as to reasonableness, without judicial inquiry, held
violation of due process, since question of reasonableness of rates is essen-
tially judicial). Cf. United Fuel Gas Co. v. P. S. C. (1914) 73 W. Va.
571, 80 S. E. 931 (statute providing for appeal from order of commission
to supreme court of appeals, which should decide the matter "as may seem
to be just and right" held unconstitutional as conferring non-judicial func-
tions upon the court, in violation of separation of powers). See also Davis,
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West Virginia-A Study in
Separation of Powers (1938) 44 W. Va. L. Q. 270, 284-286.
In some situations in Missouri, rate-making has been called legislative.
State ex rel. Missouri Southern R. R. v. P. S. C. (1914) 259 Mo. 704,
168 S. W. 1156 was a proceeding in mandamus to determine whether the
commission had power under the 1913 statute to allow a rate in excess of
that prescribed by elder statutes. It was said that the commission had the
power to exercise the legislative function delegated to it to fix railroad
rates. State ex rel. Rhodes v. P. S. C. (1917) 270 Mo. 547, 194 S. W. 287
approved the delegation by the legislature of its rate-making function. In
State ex rel. Waterworth v. Harty (1919) 278 Mo. 685, 213 S. W. 443, a
proceeding to require the State Superintendent of Insurance to permit a
10% increase in fire insurance rates, it was said: "The establishment of a
rate is a making of a rule for the future, and, therefore, is an act legisla-
tive, not judicial in kind."
69. R. S. Mo. (1939) §9824.
70. R. S. Mo. (1939) §9984.
71. R. S. Mo. (1939) §10059.
72. Mo. Laws of 1939, 622, §13. The board is appointed in the first in-
stance by a county court, when the latter has adopted a zoning plan.
73. R. S. Mo. (1939) §11445.
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afforded. Thus in the federal courts it has been said that in
reviewing the determination of an administrative body, if the
court reviews both law and facts, it is called upon to act merely
as a revising administrative agency and must refuse to do so.7
Where the court is required to consider only questions of law,
however, its function is purely judicial and it may take jurisdic-
tion no matter what the character of the proceedings below.7 5
This distinction does not seem to have been made in Missouri,
although the question has never been directly decided 7 6 but it
will be noted that Missouri statutes providing for review of ad-
ministrative action by certiorari call for review of both law and
facts, for trial de novo, or for trial as in equity.77
74. Federal Radio Comm. v. General Elec. Co. (1930) 281 U. S. 464. In
the leading case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. (1908) 211 U. S. 210,
it was said that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in reviewing rates
fixed by the corporation commission acted legislatively, because it could
enter such an order as in its opinion the commission should have made.
That it was a judicial function to set aside unreasonable or confiscatory
rates, but that the reviewing court should have no power to revise or change,
was indicated in the early case of Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.
(1894) 154 U. S. 362. See also Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co. (1923) 261
U. S. 428. In International Business Mach. Corp. v. Lewis & Clark Co.
(Mont. 1941) 112 P. (2d) 477, plaintiff appealed from a decision of the
state board of equalization. It was held that if the state board acted within
the law, its action was not reviewable, otherwise there would be a violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers, and that a statute providing for
appeal to the district court from a decision of the state board was invalid
to the extent that it purported to authorize the district court to act as an
assessing tribunal. Some state courts, however, have gone rather far in
assuming what seem to be non-judicial functions. Thus, in Hill v. Martin
(1935) 296 U. S. 393, it was held that the Supreme Court of New Jersey's
review of the administrative act of assessing was a judicial action, under
the New Jersey law, in spite of the court's power to consider evidence and
"reverse or affirm, in whole or in part" the proceedings begun before the
State Tax Commissioner. Consequently, such an appeal within the state
could not be enjoined by a federal court. See also Davis, supra note 68,
at 856, 357, and Donley, The Hodges Case and Beyond (1939) 45 W. Va.
L. Q. 291, which discusses the West Virginia judiciary's assumption and
refusal to assume non-judicial functions.
75. In Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co. (1933)
289 U. S. 266, the Supreme Court held that the decisions of the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia were judicial and reviewable on cer-
tiorari where the lower court's review of the proceedings of the Federal
Radio Commission was limited to questions of law. In the previous case
of Federal Radio Comm. v. General Elec. Co. (1930) 281 U. S. 464, it had
been held that where the court of appeals acted merely as a superior and
revising agency, its decisions were not reviewable on certiorari.
76. But see State ex rel. Spencer v. Anderson (Mo. App. 1937) 101 S. W.
(2d) 530, which held invalid an ordinance providing for review as upon
trial de noio in the circuit court of determinations of the excise commis-
sioner.
77. E. g., R. S. Mo. (1939) §11445 provides for review of questions of
law and fact determined by the auditor. There is a trial de novo of a
refusal to grant a license to a medical school, R. S. Mo. (1939) §9984; a
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SCOPE OF REVIEW
Common Law Certiorari
In certiorari proceedings in Missouri, the courts have been
concerned primarily with two questions, viz., what record the
writ brings up for review, and what questions are to be con-
sidered upon review.
In Missouri, as at common law, the writ brings up only the
record proper. The decisions are not clear, however, as to what
are the contents of the record proper. Perhaps the simplest rec-
ord is that of the board of arbitrators in proceedings for the
change of boundaries of school districts. It has been said that
the record of their award is the only legal record to be certified
up.78 The content of the record proper seems to differ with each
agency. Formerly, the parties were sometimes allowed to stipu-
late as to the contents ;79 this procedure was disapproved, how-
ever, in State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf.80
Whether or not the evidence should be a part of the record
proper has been a much debated question. There are numerous
statements to the effect that it is not,81 and that additional evi-
dence cannot be taken.8 2 In the recent case of State ex rel.
Spencer v. Anderson,83 an ordinance which provided that the cir-
cuit court should, on certiorari, consider the evidence heard be-
fore the excise commissioner and determine for itself the merits
of the question of revocation of a tavern license as upon a trial
de novo was held invalid. The court said that the writ would
issue as at common law, and that the court's review was limited
to questions of jurisdiction, the evidence before the excise com-
missioner not being a part of the record, and extrinsic evidence
being inadmissible in the circuit court.
trial as in equity of orders of the Public Service Commission, R. S. Mo.
(1939) §5690.
78. State ex rel. School Dist v. Sexton (1910) 151 Mo. App. 517, 132
S. W. 11; School Dists. v. Yates (1912) 161 Mo. App. 107, 142 S. W. 791.
79. State ex rel. Union Electric Light & Power Co. v. Gehner (1926) 315
Mo. 666, 286 S. W. 117; State ex rel. Y. M. C. A. v. Gehner (1928) 320
Mo. 1172, 11 S. W. (2d) 30.
80. (Mo. 1940) 139 S. W. (2d) 958; Comment (1940) 26 WASHINGTON
U. LAw QUARTERLY 129.
81. See, e. g., House v. Clinton County Ct. (1878) 67 Mo. 522; State ex
rel. Brennan v. Walbridge (1895) 62 Mo. App. 162; State ex rel. Bentley v.
Reynolds (1905) 190 Mo. 578, 89 S. W. 877; State ex rel. City of St. Louis
v. Caulfield (1933) 333 Mo. 270, 62 S. W. (2d) 818.
82. State ex rel. Robinson v. Neosho (1894) 57 Mo. App. 192; State ex
rel. McCune v. Carter (1919) 279 Mo. 304, 214 S. W. 180 (court cannot go
beyond face of the record); State ex rel. Davis v. Walden (1933) 332 Mo.
680, 60 S. W. (2d) 24.
83. (Mo. App. 1937) 101 S. W. (2d) 530.
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This might make it appear that evidence is never considered
by the superior tribunal. The Missouri courts have not always
been so strict, however, and they seem at times to have entirely
forgotten their rule. Thus, in an early case,8 4 the court, on cer-
tiorari to the board of equalization, examined an annual assess-
ment in spite of its not being in the record and decided that it
was valid. It is sometimes difficult to determine whether the
court has considered the evidence, or how much it has been in-
fluenced by it,--if, for instance, the evidence is set out in the
opinion, but the appellate court says it declines to consider it85
In State ex rel. American Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Gehner, 6 a proceeding in certiorari to quash an assessment of
the Board of Equalization of the City of St. Louis, the supreme
court seems to have considered a good deal of the evidence.
8 7 It
said :""
Whatever counsel may say as to the conclusiveness of any
finding of facts by the Board of Equalization, it cannot
claim that the board's conclusion of law is binding upon this
court; for that matter, neither is its finding of fact where it
is contrary to the figures presented.
It is often possible for the courts to consider evidence, even
though they state that their review is confined to questions of
jurisdiction,89 since jurisdiction is an elastic concept.9' In the
84. State ex rel. Halpin v. Powers (1878) 68 Mo. 320.
85. See State ex rel. Mount Mora Cemetery Ass'n v. Casey (1908) 210
Mo. 285, 109 S. W. 1.
86. (1928) 320 Mo. 702, 8 S. W. (2d) 1057, 59 A. L. R. 1026.
87. For example, at one point the court said: "One important fact ob-
trudes itself upon our attention, if relator is sustained. This company pays
no taxes either in this State or any other, as we shall presently show.
No matter how prosperous it is, no matter how great dividends it may pay
to its stockholders, it contrived a statement which would prevent it paying
any taxes anywhere of any kind or character." State ex rel. American
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Gehner (1928) 320 Mo. 702, 709, 8 S. W. (2d) 1057,
1058, 59 A. L. R. 1026.
88. State ex rel. American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Gehner (1928) 320
Mo. 702, 711, 8 S. W. (2d) 1057, 1059, 59 A. L. R. 1026.
89. There is a line of cases from Hannibal & St. Joseph I. R. v. Morton
(1858) 27 Mo. 317, to State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Evans (Mo. 1940)
189 S. W. (2d) 967 that the reviewing court will consider only questions
of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal must appear affirma-
tively in the record. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Young (1888) 96 Mo. 39,
8 S. W. 776; State ex rel. Rippee v. Forest (1914) 177 Mo. App. 245, 162
S. W. 706. But once the higher court determines that the inferior tribunal
had jurisdiction, it will not interfere. State ex inf. Keller v. Buchanan
County Ct. (1909) 135 Mo. App. 143, 116 S. W. 14; State ex rel. Gloyd v.
Gilbert (1912) 164 Mo. App. 139, 148 S. W. 125.
90. See, e. g., Crowell v. Benson (1932) 285 U. S. 22 (existence of em-
ployer-employee relationship under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act and occurrence of injuries on navigable waters of United States "juris-
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early case of State v. Schneider, which involved the trial of the
county judges for contempt in a matter concerning applications
to the county court for dramshop licenses, it was said :91
The writ of certiorari * * * is in the nature of a writ of
error with this difference, that it brings up only the record
of the inferior tribunal for inspection, and the trial upon it
is a trial of questions jurisdictional in their nature, and not
a trial de novo except of matters affecting the jurisdiction
of the court. (Italics supplied.)
On a trial de novo of matters affecting jurisdiction, it would be
very easy for a court to consider evidence on the merits. In a
later case concerning a dramshop license, 2 the reviewing court
considered the evidence and found that as a matter of law a
dramshop keeper who on one occasion furnished liquor to two
minors was not guilty of "not at all times keeping an orderly
house." Consequently, it was held that the county court was
"without jurisdiction" to revoke the dramshop license, and its
record was quashed.
In its most limited sense, the question of jurisdiction is merely
whether the agency has complied with statutory requisites. 3
Thus, the absence of notice required by statute is a jurisdictional
defect, and, taking a step further, the court will also consider
whether the notice given was sufficient.9 4 The sufficiency of
notice may be a jurisdictional question even in the absence of
a statutory requirement of notice.95
Agencies have been held to have acted in excess of their juris-
diction if their action was arbitrary. Thus in one case involving
removal from office, the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Com-
missioners was reversed for its refusal to postpone its hearing
dictional facts" reviewable de novo). But cf. South Chicago Coal & Dock
Co. v. Bassett (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 522, aff'd (1940) 309 U. S.
251 (worker concededly an employee, but dispute whether employee of char-
aeter protected; held not a "jurisdictional" matter requiring judicial re-
trial).
91. (1892) 47 Mo. App. 669, 675.
92. State ex rel. Arnold v. Lichta (1908) 130 Mo. App. 284, 109 S. W.
825.
93. See, e. g., State ex rel. Reider v. Moniteau County Ct. (1891) 45 Mo.
App. 387; State ex rel. Rippee v. Forest (1914) 177 Mo. App. 245, 162
S. W. 706; State ex rel. American Central Ins. Co. v. Gehner (1926) 315
Mo. 1126, 280 S. W. 416.
94. State ex rel. Ruppel v. Wiethaupt (1914) 254 Mo. 319, 162 S. W. 163.
95. State ex rel. Harrison County Bank v. Springer (1896) 134 Mo. 212,
35 S. W. 589 (notice by publication of increased tax assessment sufficient) ;
State ex rel. McLeod Lumber Co. v. Baker (1902) 170 Mo. 194, 70 S. W.
470 (notice waived); State ex rel. Davidson v. Caldwell (1925) 310 Mo.
397, 276 S. W. 631 (insufficient notice).
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to give the relator time to prepare an answer, 9 and in another,
the police commissioners were held to have acted arbitrarily in
removing the Chief of Police without having heard any evidence.
It was said that there must have been as much legal evidence as
would justify a court in submitting the issue to a jury.97
In a later case, State ex rel. Kennedy v. Remrers,98 which also
involved removal from office, the court refused to consider the
sufficiency of the evidence at all and said :99
Under the common-law rule the scope of the review by
certiorari is never extended to the merits. The action of the
inferior body is final and conclusive on every question except
jurisdiction or power. The only questions presented are ques-
tions of law on the record. * * * "This writ, * * * only brings
up the record, and can only reach errors or defects which
appear on the face of the record of the tribunal to which it
is issued, and which are jurisdictional in their nature."
This case was distinguished in State ex rel. Woodmansee v.
Ridge,100 in which it was said that the line of cases holding that
certiorari was a proper remedy to review other than jurisdic-
tional questions, if there was no remedy by appeal or writ of
error, still stood. Thus, where the tribunal, although rightfully
entertaining jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy,
had exceeded its legitimate powers, its record was quashed on
certiorari. The Woodmansee case and the line of cases referred
to involved certiorari to the circuit or probate courts, rather than
to an administrative body; however, there would seem to be no
reason to distinguish between the two types of tribunals.
Statutory Certiorari '
When we turn to the statutes providing for review by cer-
tiorari of the proceedings of certain agencies, we find little uni-
formity in their provisions as to the scope of review, and except
for the Public Service Commission and State Board of Health,
there are no decisions to guide us.
It is probable that common law certiorari was intended in the
96. State ex rel. Tedford v. Knott (1907) 207 Mo. 167, 105 S. W. 1040.
97. State ex rel. Campbell v. Police Commissioners (1883) 14 Mo. App.
297, aff'd (1885) 88 Mo. 144.
98. (1986) 340 Mo. 126, 101 S. W. (2d) 70.
99. State ex rel. Kennedy v. Remmers (1936) 340 Mo. 126, 131, 101 S. W.
(2d) 70, 71.
100. (1938) 343 Mo. 702, 123 S. W. (2d) 20. For a very recent case
involving certiorari to the board of equalization, in which it was said that
questions of law arising on the face of the record would be considered, see
State ex rel. Lane v. Corneli (Mo. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 815.
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statute providing for review of the action of the State Board of
Chiropractic Examiners," 1 since the legislature has not indicated
otherwise. Other statutes providing for review by certiorari,
however, have gone considerably beyond the common law. The
most recent statute which calls for review by certiorari is of the
hybrid variety.102 It provides that a county court which has
adopted a zoning plan shall appoint a county board of zoning
adjustment. Persons aggrieved by a decision of this board may
petition the circuit court which "may allow a writ of certiorari
directed to the board for review of the data and records acted
upon or it may appoint a referee to take additional evidence in
the case. The court may reverse or affirm or may modify the
decision brought up for review." This differs from the tradi-
tional certiorari not only in the scope of the review and the con-
sideration of additional evidence, but also in the disposition made
of the case by the court.
Common law certiorari is not the certiorari indicated in an-
other recent statute, which concerns determinations of the State
Auditor in administering the provisions of the sales tax.103 There
it is provided that the circuit court may review by certiorari "all
questions of law and fact determined by the auditor."
In the statute providing for review of decisions of the Public
Service Commission,' 0" it is said that suits in the circuit court
and in the supreme court on appeal shall be tried as suits in
equity. Varied interpretations have been made of this provi-
sion,105 together with the provisions of the statutes providing that
orders of the commission are prima facie lawful and reasonable' 0
and that the burden of proof is upon the party adverse to the
commission to show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the
order is unreasonable or unlawful. 07
To be reasonable and lawful, the commission's order must be
supported by substantial evidence, but the commission will not
be reversed merely because it has received incompetent evidence;
and the former view that the court could weigh the evidence08
101. R. S. Mo. (1939) §10059.
102. Mo. Laws of 1939, 622, §13.
103. R. S. Mo. (1939) §11445.
104. R. S. Mo. (1939) §5690.
105. See, e. g., State ex rel. Wabash R. R. v. P. S. C. (1917) 271 Mo. 155,
196 S. W. 369; State ex rel. M. K. & T. Ry. v. P. S. C. (1919) 277 Mo.
175, 210 S. W. 386; State ex rel. Ozark Power & W. Co. v. P. S. C. (1921)
287 Mo. 522, 531, 229 S. W. 782.
106. R. S. Mo. (1939) §5702.
107. R. S. Mo. (1939) §5703.
108. State ex rel. Capital City Water Co. v. P. S. C. (1923) 298 Mo. 524,
252 S. W. 446.
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has been discredited. 0 9 Thus the trial in the circuit court is not
de novo. The court cannot make a finding of facts except to deter-
mine whether an order is reasonable and lawful; it cannot mod-
ify the findings of the commission or make findings of its own.110
There are two statutes providing for review of action of the
State Board of Health. Its proceedings in revoking a license to
practice medicine"' or in revoking the certificates of cosmetolo-
gists, hairdressers, and manicurists" 2 may be reviewed by a spe-
cial certiorari which includes a review of all the evidence. A
related statute provides that the question of whether a medical
school is one entitled to recognition by the State Board of Medi-
cal Examiners is a question of fact which may be reviewed on
certiorari by a trial of the question de novo."
3
The extent of judicial review under these enlarged writs of
certiorari is clearly greater than that which is usually allowed
under the common law writ, since the court is not limited to
jurisdictional questions,"' or even to questions of law on the
record. Jurisdictional questions do appear, however, as for exam-
ple, that of sufficiency of notice." 5 The board was at one time
limited, and judicial review was correspondingly broadened by
the court's strict construction of the statute as penal."i6 This
interpretation was later liberalized, and the board is allowed the
exercise of a reasonable discretion." 7 There has been some diffi-
culty, however, in determining what evidence can be received by
the board. Since the investigation is not a lawsuit, the technical
rules of procedure applicable to a judicial trial are not manda-
109. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. P. S. C. (1932) 329 Mo. 918, 47
S. W. (2d) 102 (en bane).
110. State ex rel. and to use of Chicago, G. W. R. R. v. P. S. C. (1932)
330 Mo. 729, 51 S. W. (2d) 73 (certiorari denied on question of due process
(1932) 287 U. S. 641). There was doubt as to this position for some time,
since the court en bane in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. P. S. C. (1915) 266
Mo. 333, 341, 181 S. W. 61 had said that trial in the supreme court was
practically de nrvo, and after due consideration, the court would accept,
modify, or reject findings of the circuit court and make such findings as
the law and evidence warranted.
111. R. S. Mo. (1939) §9990.
112. R. S. Mo. (1939) §9824.
113. R. S. Mo. (1939) §9984.
114. State ex rel. Horton v. Clark (1928) 320 Mo. 1190, 9 S. W. (2d)
685.
115. See State ex rel. Kerr v. Landwehr (Mo. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 83;
State ex rel. Baepler v. State Board of Health (1932) 330 Mo. 1200, 52
S. W. (2d) 743.
116. State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson (1913) 253 Mo. 271, 161 S. W.
1169 (action of board quashed because of insufficient evidence).
117. State ex rel. Horton v. Clark (1928) 320 Mo. 1190, 9 S. W. (2d)
685; State ex rel. Lentine v. State Board of Health (1933) 334 Mo. 220,
65 S. W. (2d) 943.
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tory.118 The board has been reversed, however, for having al-
lowed hearsay testimony.129
The statute relative to the licensing of medical schools is unique
in providing for a trial de novo. This provision, in itself, is a
considerable departure from traditional certiorari. In the only
case which invoked the statute,1 20 certiorari was granted without
notice of the fact that the court was trying de novo a proceeding
which, under the Missouri decisions, would seem to be non-judi-
cial. Since the proceeding is de novo, what happened in the in-
ferior tribunal is of little importance in the higher court.
CONCLUSION
A review of the cases has shown that the concept of "judicial
function" is very elusive. Perhaps it can be argued that the con-
fusion is not regrettable, since it would seem to allow a court to
review each function separately, with emphasis on the court's
"hunch for justice" in the particular instance. If, as would seem
to be the case in at least some instances, a particular function is
held to be judicial or non-judicial quite capriciously, or merely
because a previous judge has said so, the time for re-examina-
tion has clearly come. A more consistent logic, to mitigate the
law's present uncertainties, seems a minimum requirement and
one which it is not unreasonable to ask the courts to supply.
Careful legislative clarification would be helpful, but a slipshod
enactment would probably do more harm than good.
The state of the Missouri law with regard to the scope of re-
view by certiorari is slightly more satisfactory, although here,
too, confusion is evident. Recent decisions indicate a liberaliza-
tion of the old rule, itself not uniformly applied, that only ques-
tions of jurisdiction would be reviewed, so that review under
common law certiorari probably now extends to all questions of
law; and there is a possibility that the substantiality of sup-
porting evidence may be considered. Under statutory certiorari,
of course, great departures have been made from the doctrines
of common law certiorari. Here the approach naturally is prag-
matic, but accidents of legislative draftsmanship have evidently
played their part in producing regrettable inconsistencies. The
use of the term, "certiorari," in statutory review provisions has
itself been fortuitous; simple appeals serve equally well and are
free of historical legalisms.
118. State ex rel. Ball v. State Board of Health (1930) 325 Mo. 41, 26
S. W. (2d) 773.
119. State ex rel. Johnson v. Clark (1921) 288 Mo. 659, 232 S. W. 1031.
120. State ex rel. Kansas City University v. North (1927) 316 Mo. 1050,
294 S. W. 1012.
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A legislative approach which abolishes common law termi-
nology and provides broadly for review proceedings having a
specified scope has been adopted in other jurisdictions,12 ' and it
is probable that legislative clarification of this phase of certiorari
could be more effective and less dangerous than enactment con-
cerning the nature of a judicial function. In constructing any
such system, however, the legislature would have to bear in mind
the question whether it has the power to confer upon the courts
the authority to review matters which those courts have previ-
ously declared to be "non-judicial." In Missouri, the question
of the legislature's power to require a complete consideration by
the courts of actions previously said to be "non-judicial" remains
unanswered.
VIRGINIA MORSEY.
121. See Art. 78, N. Y. Civil Practice Act §§1283-1306 (Thompson's
Laws of New York (1939) 1786-1789). No change was made in the sub-
stantive law as to right of relief, but a uniform procedure for obtaining
such relief was established. See also the proposed Uniform Administrative
Procedure Act, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and Proceedings, Handbook (1940) 384. The draft was adopted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at the
Philadelphia meeting in 1940 and recommended to the American Bar Asso-
ciation. Meanwhile the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, Final Report (1941) was published, and the bar association re-
manded the act to the commissioners for further study. In any legislation
of this kind, the draftsmen are met with numerous problems, such as the
difficulty of definition and the danger of too much uniformity.
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